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2Jack Beebe*
Since 1979, a turbulent economy and an environment ofdereg-
ulation have raised concern over bank risk. In the last two years,
the proliferation ofproblem loans has heightened this concern. The
following study presents empirical evidence on risk and returns of
the stocks of82 U. S. bank holding companies with assets over $1
billion each. Judging from stock performance, the post-1979 eco-
nomic and deregulatory environment, at least until 1982, was not
unfavorable to bank holding companies with assets over $1 billion
and was favorable overall to those with assets ranging from $1
billion to $10 billion. Since 1982, there has been a sharp downward
valuation on average in the equities ofthe very large bank holding
companies-those with assets over $10 billion. Statistical analysis
suggests that domestic energy losses and Latin American debt ex-
posures may be largely responsible.
Since 1979, turbulence in financial markets
and changes in the regulatory environment
have raised concern over bank risk. The five-
year span saw two recessions and wide varia-
tions in real growth, inflation, and interest
rates. Uncertainty also has extended wen be-
yond U. S. markets, as high interest rates, dra-
matic changes in exchange rates and relative
commodity prices, and worldwide economic
slumps have helped to bring on potential for-
eign debt crises.
At the same time that the external economic
environment has been volatile, the deregulation
ofU. S. banking has proceeded at a rapid pace.
Beginning with the money market certificate in
1978 and proceeding through the Depository
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Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 and the Depository Institutions
Deregulation Act of 1982, deposit rate ceilings
have been all but eliminated for banks and
thrifts while othernonbanking institutions have
taken on bank-like powers.
In an earlier paper (Beebe, 1983), the author
addressed the question of whether or not the
equity risk of large bank holding companies
(hereafter, "banks") had increased in the 1979-
82 period as a result of the change in the eco-
nomic and deregulatory environment.1 That
study found that neither the risk nor returns of
the stocks of banks with assets over $1 billion
seemed to have been affected adversely by the
post-1979 monetary and deregulatory environ-
ment, at least through mid-1982. On the con-
trary, the study found some evidence of a de-
cline in risk-sensitivity for the group consisting
of the largest banks, those with assets over $10
billion.
Since 1982, bank risk has received renewed
notice. Problem domestic loans have prolifer-ated, particularly within sectors suffering sig-
nificant declines in relative prices, such as en-
ergy, construction, real estate, agriculture, and
timber. Moreover, defaults and reschedulings
of loans to foreign corporations and govern-
ments have become realities in some cases and
sobering possibilities in others. Financial mar-
kets weathered the failures of Drysdale Gov-
ernment Securities in May 1982, Penn Square
Bank less than two months later, the purchase
of Seafirst Corporation by BankAmerica Cor-
poration, and the "failure" of Continental Illi-
nois Bank. During 1984 alone, an estimated
seventy-nine commercial banks failed, the larg-
est number in any year since 1938.
In light of these recent developments, the
present study looks again at bank equities in
thepost"1979 environment with an emphasis on
thy periodsince 1982. In this study, the equities
of 82 major U.S. bank holding companies
("banks") with year-end 1981 assets of over $1
biHionareanalyzed to determine whether or
not theperiodthiough September 1984 depicts
abnormal risk or returns. For the largest 24
banks, stock returns since 1982 are related sta-
tistically to total debt exposures to the Latin
American countries ofArgentina, Brazil, Mex-
ico and Venezuela.
In the sections that follow, there is first a
brief description of the major events that could
have affected bank stocks since 1979, then a
description of the statistical procedures em-
ployed, and finally a presentation of the em-
pirical results and conclusions.
I. Events Since 1979
Since 1979, a number of important develop-
ments have unfolded that could have had dra-
matic effects on the equity risk and returns of
large banks. Table 1 gives a chronological list
of a number of such events. However, the
changing environment of banking is better
understood in the context of broader develop-
ments. Several such developments have oc-
curred since 1979: (1) From October 6, 1979
through approximately October 1982, the Fed-
eral Reserve's short-run operating procedures
targeted nonborrowed reserves rather than the
federal funds rate or borrowed reserves; (2) the
1979-82 period was characterized by consid-
erable interest-rate volatility; (3) in March
1980, Congress passed the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
(DIDMCA) which, among other changes, ex-
tended NOW accounts to banks and thrifts on
a nationwide basis and called for the phase-out
of deposit rate ceilings; (4) since 1979, the eco-
nomic environment has been one ofvolatile in-
flation (on the downside as well as the upside)
and relative prices (particularly in world com-
modity markets such as oil), recessions in the
U.S. and abroad, and high real interest rates
worldwide; (5) the financial environment has
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seen an increased number of defaults and fail-
ures among thrifts, government securities deal-
ers, and banks.
It would have been difficult to say a priori
how this complex combination of events would
affect the equities of large U.S. banks either in
absolute terms or in relation to the stock mar-
ket as a whole. The outcome would have de-
pended not only on how the events actually un-
folded, but also on the extent to which banks
had anticipated or hedged against them,
through ex ante portfolio and operational poli-
cies, and the degree to which intervention and
protection by the regulators was perceived as
important by the market. It would have been a
plausible beliefthat turbulence within the econ-
omy would have increased the risk and de-
pressed the prices of bank stocks held at the
time. However there was no reason to presup-
pose that bank stocks would have been affected
more adversely than the stock market in gen-
eral. The impact ofderegulation on the equities
of large banks might have been expected to be
positive, because of some combination of re-
duced risk and/or increased returns (see Beebe,
1983). Whether on balance regulatory protec-
tion was perceived to have increased cannot beTABLE 1
Events Affecting.U.S. Banks
7determined for sure, but the 1980 rise in the
deposit insurance limit from $40,000 to
$100,000 certainly was one corroborating
factor.2
Given the many collinear impacts of ques-
tionable direction and degree, the strategy em-
ployed below to gauge any change in bank cap-
ital risk is to examine the behavior of bank
equity risk and returns without offering a full
model that explains risk and returns with ex-
ogenous variables. As a partial explanation,
however, a model is estimated that relates stock
returns since 1982 to Latin American debt ex-
posures for the largest 24 banks.
In the empirical section that follows, bank
stock prices are analyzed first in an absolute
sense to point out the degree of actual price
variation in critical periods. Then, bank stock
returns are compared with returns on the S&P
500, which serves as a proxy of the "stock mar-
ket." The empirics employ the single-index
market model from the finance literature. This
model postulates that capital risk sensitivity can
be represented by the equity "beta" orthe mea-
sured sensitivityofthe firm's (orportfolio's) eq-
uity return with respect to the return on the
market bundle of risky assets (originally,
Sharpe, 1963).3 Precisely because it is measured
in relation to an index of risky assets, beta rep-
resents sensitivity to commonly experienced, or
nondiversifiable (often called "systematic")
risk. According to the capital asset pricing in-
terpretation of the single-index market model,
assets with a high beta should have a high ex-
pected return because such assets have a high
degree of nondiversifiable risk (originally,
Sharpe, 1964).
In its simplest form, the single-index model
is:
percentage return for the individual
bank stock over the period t in ex-
cess of the risk-free rate of interest.
For this study, time periods are
monthly intervals and returns are
price returns calculated from month-
end closing prices, exclusive of div-
idends and the risk-free rate of in-
terest-that is,
(1)
II. Tests for Equity Risk and Return
SPt percentage return on the S&P 500 in
excess ofthe risk-free rate ofinterest.
Again, returns are monthly price re-
turns using month-end closing prices
exclusive of dividends and the risk-
free rate of interest. (Calculated as
described above for BK.)
"excess" or"risk-adjusted" return for
the sample period-i.e., in excess of
the return earned for taking on non-
diversifiable risk, as measured
through beta.
the elasticity of the bank stock price
with respect to the S&P 500 (inter-
preted as the sensitivity to nondiver-
sifiable or "systematic" risk).
error term (interpreted as non-mar-
ket-related, or residual, risk).
For the "average" stock in the S&P 500, the
value of beta will be 1.0 by definition. Stocks
with true betas above 1.0 carry above average
nondiversifiable risk and, according to the cap-
ital asset pricing model, will have above aver-
age ex ante expected returns. Since the model
predicts that only nondiversifiable risk will
yield positive expected returns, the ex ante ex-
pected value of alpha in the model is zero.5
However, the ex post measured value of alpha
may differ from zero because it will reflect the
impact of new information (surprises) on the
stock's price during the period of estimation.
Several questions can be addressed using the
above model. Questions relevant here are: (1)
whether the price of bank equity is more or less
sensitive to nondiversifiable (or "systematic")
risk than the average equity in the S&P 500
(that is, what is the extent to which bank betas
are greater than, equal to, or less than one?);
(2) whether there are significant shifts in beta;
(Pt - Pt - 1) 4




8and (3) whether, during turbulent periods,
bank stocks actually have significant ex post
positive or negative alpha (that is, whether new
information leaves positive or negative effects
on bank stock prices after adjustments are
madefor the stock~snormalco-movements with
the stock market).
Betagives a measure ofriskor co-movement
with the overall stock market while alpha gives
a measure of return in excess ofthat associated
with beta. Ifthe market perceives bank equities
to be hedged (or protected by government)
against systematic risk, bank betas will be low.
If the market interprets new information re-
ceived during the estimation period to be ad-
verse to banks, the estimate of alpha will be
negative. New information conceivably could
affect both the stock's beta (systematic risk sen-
sitivity) and alpha (value beyond that risk sen-
sitivity). The fonowing analysis focuses primar-
ily on whether or not developments since 1979
have affected these parameters.
From their depressed levels in 1975, the two
groups ofsmaller banks generally performed
strongly over the 1976-84 period. This
strong performance may have been due to
the fact that regional banks benefitted from
anticipated and actual deregulation, partic-
ularly of consumer deposit rate ceilings.
3. Since early 1983, the group of $10+ billion
banks has had a widely different price per-
formance from that ofthe other two groups.
Since May 1983, stocks in the group of$10+
billion banks have declined in price an av-
erage of 8 percent, while average stock
prices in the $5-10 billion and $1-5 billion
groups each have risen 16 percent. Itis plau-
sible that the poor performance of the larg-
est banks since early 1983 resulted from in-
creasing investorconcern overforeign loans.
Although the indices inFigure 1give an over-
all picture of the performance of large bank
equities over the 12-year period, it is possible
to use the market model to separate the risk
and return measures of bank-stock perfor-
mance. Table 2 gives estimates of bank stock
betas for the fun twelve-year period and for
subperiods of approximately three years in
length. Despite uncertainty as to a representa-
tive estimate of beta in the 1979-81 period (see
the footnote to the table), it is apparent that
the $10 billion and $5-10 billion banks tend to
have average betas above one and the $1-5 bil-
lion banks, below one. Moreover, beta tended
on average to decline in the middle of the pe-
riod for all three groups and then to rise again
for the two groups of largest banks.
IU. Empirical Evidence
2. The data consist of month-end closing com-
mon equity prices for 82 bank holding compa-
nies ("banks") with total assets over $1 billion
as of year-end 1981. Twenty-two of these banks
have assets over $10 billion, 17 have assets of
$5-10 billion and 43, assets of $1-5 billion.6
Figure 1 depicts stock-price levels for the S&P
500 and for equally weighted indices of the
three bank groups. For the full period of over
12 years, the price returns of equities for the
three groups of banks generally have kept up
with those ofthe S&P 500, although there were
some subperiods that were marked exceptions.7
Some of the most noteworthy of the trends
in bank stock prices in Figure 1 are worth high-
lighting and examining here:
1. All bank stocks and the S&P 500 experi-
enced significant declines in value during
1974. The S&P 500 declined by 34 percent
between January and September of 1974,
while the bank stocks declined by even
more. Moreover, the $1-5 billion and $5-
10 billion banks suffered severe and long-
lasting downward adjustments in value rel-
ative to the S&P 500 and the $10+ billion
banks. It is difficult to pinpoint the cause of
the long-lasting effect. It could have been
due to interest-rate exposures from mort-
gage holdings, although this conclusion is
contradicted by the relatively low betas for
these two bank groups (shown later). Dis-
intermediation attributable to consumer de-
posit-rate ceilings and loan defaults in non-
diversified lending portfolios are other
possible explanations.
9As described in the introduction, bank stock
prices did not seem to reflect increased bank
risk until about 1982, when domestic and inter-
national lending risks became paramount. To
test for more than one shift in the post-1979
where
Do one for 1972:08 - 1979:09 and
zero thereafter.
one for 1979:10-1981:12 and
zero otherwise.
following variation ofthe market model [Equa-
tion (1)] allows both alpha and beta to shift at
1979:10 and again at 1982:01:
BKt = ao Do + al D I + a2 D2
+ 130 (SPt) + 13s1 (SPt x D1) (2)
+ 13s2 (SPt x D2) + et
zero otherwise.
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10TABLE 2
Betas for Bank Stocks, 1912:08-1984:09
Mean Estimates from Individual Bank Regressions
72:08-84:09 72:08-75:12 76:01-78:12 79:01-81:12 82:01-84:09
All Banks .93 1.00 .88 .78 .98
$10+ Billion 1.06 1.19 1.07 .64 1.23
$5-10 Billion 1.03 1.06 1.01 .87 1.14
$1-5 Billion .83 .87 .73 .81 .78
lBeta for the boxed-in period is estimated for the 36 months, 1979:01-81:12, excluding the 12 months 1980:07-81:06.
During the excluded 12-month period, bank stocks moved contrary to the S&P 500 in a way that gives spurious and
misleadingly low estimates of the bank stock betas. For !he excluded 12-month period, mean bet;!s were .07, - .22, .01,
and - .02 for the four groups, respectively, and median R2 values were zero or negative. Median R2 values for all estimates
shown in the table ranged between .20 and .54.
TABLE 3
Risk and Returns of Bank Stocks
Mean Coefficient Values and Median Test Statistics
From Individual Bank Regressions
1972:08-1984:09 with Shifts at 1979:10 and 1982:01
(\(0 (\(1 (\(2 Po PS1 (3S2 R2 O'e
All Banks 0.0% 0.3% 0.4% .97 -.20 .01 .30 6.8%
(.02) (.30) (.60) (6.22)*2 (- .45) (.04)
$10+ bil 0.3 0.1 -0.4 1.15 - .57 .08 .39 6.4
(.47) (.18) ( .25) (8.04)* (-2.13)* (.12)
$5-10 bil 0.1 -0.1 0.7 1.05 .18 .09 .33 6.9
(.01 ) (.00) (.72) (5.89)* (- .45) (.17)
$1-5 bil -0.2 0.5 0.8 .84 - .02 -.06 .26 7.1
(-.29) (.41 ) (.77) (5.38)* (.07) (- .17)
Coefficient values reported are means of the estimated values for the individual bank regressions in the group. Other
statistics reported are median values. Figures in parentheses are median t-statistics from the individual bank regressions in
the group. Asterisks denote significance of the median t-statistic at the 90% confidence level (one-tailed test for 130 and
two-tailed test for alphas and for 13shifts)' 13shift values and their t-statistics are relative to the base period 130 value. Alpha
values and t-statistics are relative to zero. Alpha values and the standard error of the estimate are expressed as monthly
percentage rates of change at monthly rates.
lBeta shift for the boxed-in period is estimated for the 1979:10-1981:12 period, excluding 1980:07-1981:06. See the note
to Table 2.
2Median t-statistics for 130 using Ho: 130 = 1.0 are - .31, .73, - .09, and -.71 for the four groups, respectively. Therefore,
median 130 estimates do not differ significantly from 1.0, the (weighted) average beta for the S&P 500.
11I3j
I3s1 the estimate of beta for
1979:10-1981:12 relative to
130 (that is, beta shift for the
second period).
I3s2 the estimate of beta for
1982:01=1984:09 relative to
130 (that is, beta shift for the
third •period relative to the
first period).
Equation (2) was estimated separately for
each of the 82 bank holding companies. Table
3 presents mean estimates ofthe coefficients in
Equation (2) and median estimates of the test
statistics for the groups of individual banks.8
For the $10+ billion banks, the mean beta was
1.15 in the pre-October-1979 period, a figure
that is well above the weighted average beta of
1.0 in the S&P 500.9 For the $10 + billion
banks, beta declined in the period between
1979:10 and 1981:12 (the decline being signifi-
cant if the 12-month 1980:07-1981:06 period is
included), but then rose again in the post-1981
subperiod. For the other two groups, there is
no evidence of a significant shift in beta. Even
for the $10+ billion banks, it is hard to con-
clude that beta shifted significantly given the
uncertainty inherent in the 1979:10-1981:12 es-
timate of beta.1o
New information received about a bank
could affect the estimates of both beta and al-
pha. However, if a bank were to announce that
some of its loans had just become subject to
certain default, it is possible that beta might be
largely unaffected while alpha would be af-
fected negatively because the market value of
the bank's capital would decline by the present
value of the default.11 As predicted by the ef-
ficient market hypothesis and the capital asset
pricing model, investors' ex ante expectations
of alpha are that it will be zero over any future
period. However, ex post observations could
exhibit positive or negative alpha depending on
new information received during the holding
(estimation) period.
Estimates of alpha are reported in Table 3.
As expected for fairly long periods, median
t-statistics for the alpha estimates indicate that
alpha is insignificant.12 However, even though
12
alpha is insignificant, a value that differs from
zero can have a large cumulative effect. In
ure2, the cumulative effect of alpha (and the
error term) is plotted over the 1982:01-1984:09
period. In the table, the actual stock price for
eachindexisplotted against a "market-related"
price, where the latter is that price that would
compensate stockholders for market-related
risk, as hypothesized by the capital asset pricing
model. The "market-related" returns are cal-
culated as follows:13
A A
BMRtj = 13j X SPl
where
estimated "market-related"
return at month t for the jth
individual bank (or bank
group)
estimated beta for the jth
bank (or bank group) over
the 1982:01-1984:09 period
(130 plus 13S2 in Equation
the actual return for the S&P
500 at month t
The vertical spread at a point in time be-
tween the two series in each frame of Figure 2
is interpreted as the cumulative effect of new
information unrelated to beta from 1981:12 up
to that point. The group of $10 + billion banks
performed worse than would have been re-
quired to compensate for their beta and move-
ments in the S&P 500, while the other two
groups performed better than their betas and
S&P 500 movements would have suggested.
Much of the differentials in performances oc-
curred in early 1983.
The strong performances within the $1-5 bil-
lion .and $5-10 billion groups suggest that the
sharp declinein interest rates between July and
November 1982 and/or further deregulation of
consumer deposits (the money market deposit
account, MMDA, ofDecember 1982) may have
been instrumental in raising the market's val-
uations of these banks. When the MMDA was
first implemented, regional banks that did not
have access to the prime national CD market
maintained that the new account would lower
their marginal costs of funds. Many of thesebanks normally had paid well above the na-
tional rates for jumbo CD's, holding company
paper, and other marginal funds, and the
MMDA would attract marginal funds at a sub-
stantially lower rate. (In contrast, many small
b;lnks and thrifts claimed tbat,althoughthe
MMDA might lower their marginal cost of
funds, it might also raise the average cost of
funds since they still had considerable amounts
of5IJ2 percent passbook savings accounts onthe
books. Thus, for small banks and thrifts not
induded in this study, the MMDA might have
resulted in a negative alpha.)
The fact that the $10+ billion banks had a
negative alpha over the 1982:01-1984:09period
while the othertwo groups had positive average
alphas suggests that there is some factor distin-
guishing the group of largest banks from the
otllertwogroups.••Onepossibilityis thatforeign
loan exposures of the largest banks may have
affected their stock prices significantly since
1982. As a test ofthis hypothesis, the following
regression was run on a cross-section of the
largest 24 banks-the 22 banks in the $10+ bil-
lion group plus the two largest banks in the $5-
10 billion group,14
Figure 2
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0:2 the individual bank alpha for
1982:01-1984:09 as estimated by
Equation (2) (see Appendix Ta-
ble Al for data across the top 22
individual banks).
L~in ~o~ns total loan exposures to
aplta Argentina, Brazil, Mex-
ico, and Venezuela for
March 31, 1984, divided
by primary bank capital
for the same date (see
Appendix Table Al for
the data).
The results of the cross-section fit for Equa-
tion (4) appear in the first line of Table 4. The
ratio is insignificant and the iP is about zero.
However, two banks of the twenty four were
extreme outliers in the pattern of residuals,
both with heavy domestic energy loan expo-
sures. When the aberrant residuals ofthese two
banks were "explained" by a single zero-one
dummy, the Latin American loan exposure ra-
tio became significant and the R2 rose to .65
(the second line in Table 4).
Latin loans
a + b Capital + e (4)
The value of the Latin American loan coef-
ficient in the second line of Table 4 indicates
that a Latin loan/capital ratio of 1.0 instead of
zero would have lowered the average monthly
stock price return over the 1982:01-1984:09 pe-
month period, the overall compounded effect
would have been a 40-percent negative impact
on a bank's stock price. Equally important, the
dummy for the two banks with heavy energy
loan exposure is also large and highly signifi-
cant-- 3.2 percent per month. This result, to-
gether with significant negative U2 values for
Seafirst and Continental Illinois of - 5.1 per-
cent and - 5.8 percent permonth (in Appendix
Table AI), suggests strongly that the problems
ofbanks with the largest negative performances
were related to energy loans rather than to
Latin American debt exposure. This conclusion
is not surprising, since the energy loan problem
resulted in a sizeable number of actual defaults
and chargeoffs while the foreign lending prob-
lem up to this point has resulted primarily in
reschedulings and fears of default. Moreover,
because the foreign loan problem affects almost
all large banks, the market might expect more
government protection in the event of a crisis
than with the energy loan problem.
TABLE 4
latin loan Exposure Related To Alpha for 1982:01-1984:09



















The Latin loan exposure ratio consists of total non-local-currency loans to Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela as
reported in the March 31, 1984, country exposure report (FFIEC-009(a») divided by primary bank capital as of March 31,
1984 (FDIC Call Report). (See Appendix Table Al for the data.) The dependent variable is el2 in Appendix Table AI.
The dummy is one for InterFirst, Dallas, and First City, Houston, and zero otherwise. It is used to capture major energy-
loan exposure.
In addition to the 22 banks in the $10+ billion size group (Appendix Table AI), the two largest banks in the $5-10 billion
group were included-North Carolina National Bank Corp. and Republic New York Corp. They had !X2 values of 1.3
percent and -0.6 percent and Latin loan/capital ratios of .19 and .55, respectively (lead-bank loan exposure divided by
lead-bank primary capital).
14a highly significant relationship across banks
appears between negative stock performance
(negative alphas) in the post-1981 period and
total debt exposures to the Latin American
countries of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and
Venezuela. On average, this negative relation-
ship is enough to account for the poor stock
performance of the 22 bank holding companies
with assets over $10 billion, taken as a group,
as compared to the 60 other bank holding com-
panies with assets of $1 billion to $10 billion,
which tend to have little Latin American debt
exposure.
There are two caveats to keep in mind re-
garding the evidence in this study. First, it
might be very misleading to extrapolate the re-
sults to smaller bank holding companies (say,
with assets under $500 million) or to thrifts.
These institutions normally have very different
portfolios and markets than do the large bank
holding companies. Second, it is plausible that
an increase in implicit regulation or govern-
ment protection has affected the stock prices of
large bank holding companies since 1979. Cer-
tainly, the increase in the deposit insurance
limit from $40,000 to $100,000 in March of1980
had a favorable impact. But we cannot be sure
ofthe market's perception, on balance, ofother
changes in regulatory protection, such as the
explicit policy changes of the FDIC, first toa
partial payout on large deposits and then to de
facto protection of all deposits and even non-
deposit liabilities in the case of Continental
Illinois.15
It is illuminating to estimate how the stocks ( __ 0.4% +1.1%), or exactly in line with the
of the 22 banks in the $10+ billion size group estimates of <X2 of0.7 and 0.8 percent permonth
might have performed had they had no Latin for the other two bank groups.
American loans. For the 22 largest banks, the These crude estimates imply that once the
average Latin loan/capital ratio is 1.02. This major energy lenders are omitted, the estimate
suggests that La.tin American loansl'ladan..im- ofthe.effectof Latin•American. loan. expoSures
pact on the average <X2 for the $10+ billion size (obtained from a cross-section estimate within
group of - 1.1 percent per month (-1.03 x the $10+ billion size group) explains the <X2
1.02). The average estimated <X2 for the $10+ differential between this group and the other
billion banks in Table 3 was -0.4 percent per two groups. (Banks within the othertwo groups
month. Without Latin American loans, there- tend to have little or no Latin American
fore, <X2 might have been 0.7 percent per month exposure.)
IV. Conclusions
In the early post-1979 period (1979:10-
1981:12), considerable uncertainty wasfound in
the estimated values of beta-a measure of the
sensitivity of equity returns to systematic, or
nondiversifiable, bank risk. By the latter part
of the post-1979 period (1982:01-1984:09), av-
erage beta values were close to the values that
prevailed over the 1972:08-1979:09 period. We
can conclude that the post-1979 period of eco-
nomic and monetary uncertainty and financial
deregulation has had no significant impact on
average on the betas of bank holding compa-
nies with assets over $1 billion. The largest
banks ($10 + billion) still have betas that av-
erage well over 1.0, while the smaller banks
($1-5 billion) have betas that average well be-
low 1.0.
Judging from stock price performance, we
can conclude that, at least until 1982, the post-
1979 economic, monetary, and deregulatory en-
vironment was not unfavorable on average to
banks with assets over $1 billion, and may have
been favorable overall to bank holding com-
panies with assets ranging from $1 billion to $10
billion. However, since 1982 there has been a
sharp downward valuation, on average, in the
equities of the very large bank holding com-
panies, those with assets over $10 billion.
Crude statistical analysis suggests that the neg-
ative performance of the $10+ billion bank
holding companies is explained by domestic en-
ergy loan losses and Latin American debt
exposures.
Once the banks with very heavy loan losses
are removed from the sample of largest banks,
15ApPENDIX Table A1
Risk and Returns of Bank Stocks, $10+ Billion Banks, Reported Individually
1972:08-1984:09 with Shifts at 1979:10 and 1982:01
Latin Loans2
Bank Holding Company «0 0(1 0(2 lJo lJS1 lJS2 R2 O'e Capital
(3/31/84)
BankAmerica Corp. 0.5% -1.7% 1.2%1.19* -1.13* .02 .35 6.7% 1.21
Citicorp -0.1 -0.2 0.4 1.26*# -.55* .32 .47 6.1 1.11
Chase Manhattan -0.3 0.5 1.3 .88* -.26 .60* .29 7.0 1.39
Manufacturers Hanover 0.3 -0.6 1.0 1.20* -.03 .32 7.1 2.05
J. P. Morgan 0.2 -0.6 0.1 1.16* -.04 .41 5.7 1.08
Chemical New York 0.0 0.6 0.1 1.18* .72 .13 .34 6.6 1.31
First Interstate 0.9 0.0 -0.4 1.38*# -.73 .25 .38 7.0 .51
Bankers Trust -0.1 1.2 0.5 1.11* -.32 .28 .41 6.2 1.25
First Chicago 0.2 -0.1 0.2 1.43*# .06 .40 7.4 .93
Security Pacific 0.4 0.4 0.5 .97* -.66* .56* .31 6.9 .57
Wells Fargo 0.6 -1.1 0.9 1.51*# -1.08 -.28 .44 6.8 1.14
Crocker National 0.4 -0.5 ~1.3 1.39*# -.87 .52 .34 7.4 1.78
Marine Midland Banks -0.5 1.2 -0.1 .61*# 1.34 .54 .27 8.1 1.16
Mellon National 0.6 0.1 -0.3 1.15* - .48 .09 .40 6.1 .80
Irving Bank Corp. 0.1 0.7 -0.4 .89* -.51 .01 .36 4.9 1.55
InterFirst, Dallas 0.4 0.6 -2.7* 1.26*# -.87 -.13 .38 6.6 .52
Northwest Bancorp., Minn. 0.4 -1.1 -0.3 1.32*# -.89 .23 .46 6.1 .86
Texas Commerce, Houston 0.6 1.5 -0.2 .89* -.29 .08 .30 ,5.8 .85
Republic of Texas, Dallas 0.8 1.3 -1.2 1.62*# -1.12 -.44 .43 7.3 1.19
First City Bancorp, Houston 0.4 1.6 -2.7* 1.18* -.27 .60* .43 6.9 .31
NBD Bancorp., Detroit 0.4 -2.0* 1.2 .87* - .46 .31 .45 4.6 .25
Bank of New York Co. -0.1 0.4 0.6 .87* .19 -.14 .33 5.7 .72
Addendum (excluded from $10+ billion bank index)
Seafirst Corp.
0.7 -0.6 -5.8* .94* -.50 .45 .27 7.4
(through 6/83)
Continental Illinois
0.4 -0.2 -5.1* 1.30* .78* .38 8.4 .72 (through 9/26/84)
Alpha values and the standard error ofthe estimate are expressed as monthly percentage rates of change at monthly rates.
Asterisks denote significance at the 90-percent confidence level (one-tailed test for [30 and two-tailed tests for alphas and
for [3shifts). 13shift values and t-statistics are relative to the base period 130 value. Alpha values and t-statistics are relative to
zero. #Denotes that [30 is statistically different from 1.0 at the 90-percent confidence level (two-tailed test).
lEstimatespf beta in the boxed-in area are for 1979:10-81:12, excluding 1980:07-81:06 (see the note to Table 2).
2The ratio for First Interstate was supplied directly to the author by the holding company and it represents holding company
Latin American loans divided by holding company capital. The other ratios in the column must be read with caution. Latin
American loan figures are from the country loan exposure report; all of the institutions reported on a lead-bank basis
except Citicorp, Bankers Trust, NBD Bancorp, and Continental Illinois which reported loans on a holding company basis.
The denominator for all ratios in the final column, except that of First Interstate, is primary capital ofthe lead bank. The
proper ratio in all cases would treat both loans and capital on a holding company basis. BankAmerica owns Seattle First
Bank. First Interstate, InterFirst, Northwest, Texas Commerce, Republic of Texas, First City and NBD are all multibank
holding companies.
Source: Equation (2) in the text. Latin American loan exposure is total non-local-currency loans to Argentina, Brazil,
Mexico, and Venezuela as of March 31, 1984 (country loan exposure report, FFIEC-009(a)). Capital is primary
bank capital from the March 31, 1984, FDIC Call Report.
16FOOTNOTES
1. From Octoper 6, 1979, through mid- tolate-1982, the
FederaIHeseI"Ve'l:!9peratiI1QproceduresWer!!fqirectedex-
plicitly to\NardcontrQllingnonborrowed re~e"veS;O¥!!lr the
short-run while allowing tl1efederal funds rate to. fluctuate
over a relatively wide range. In other periods, the Fed has
tended to hold the short-run variability of the federal funds
rate· towithin a narrowband.
The der!!l9ulationofbanking,particularlYdepOSit-rate deC
regulation and the extension of checkable •.deposits to
thrifts, was greatly accelerated by passage of the Deposi-
tory Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
March 1980 (DIDMCA). Passage of such a bill became
anticipated by the market as early as late-1979. Over the
1980-83 period, deposit rate ceilings on consumer ac-
counts atpanks and thrifts. were effectively eliminated. The
Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of October 1982
(Garn-St Germain Act) furthered deposit rate der!!l9ulation
by requiring that the Depository Institutions Deregulation
Committee create an account at banks and thrifts that
would be competitive with money market mutual funds. The
Act also gave the regulators more leeway in arranging
takeovers of failing banks and thrifts, and put into legisla-
tion much of the deregulation of thrift holding company
powers that had been implemented by the Federal Home
loan Bank during 1982.
2. For evidence on the effect of regulatory protection, see
Brickley and James, 1984.
3. In theory, the market bundle of risky assets should in-
clude bonds, real estate, and other forms of wealth. How-
ever, empirical tests of the market model almost always
use a broad stock market index such as the S&P 500 be-
cause reliable market-value indices of other risky assets
are not available.
4. Dividends paid out during a particular month should be
included with price returns to obtain total returns. Because
of data limitations, dividends are omitted from the bank
stock returns throughout the study. For consistency, they
also are omitted from S&P 500. The exclusion of dividends
affects average returns and estimates of alpha, but it has
little effect on the estimated betas because almost all of
the monthly variations in total stock returns are in the
prices.
The capital asset pricing model specifies that the relation-
ship between returns in Equation (1) will be linear as long
as returns are specified in excess of the "risk free" rate.
Thus, all returns of the bank stocks and the S&P 500 in
the empirical analysis are net of the return from holding to
maturity Treasury bills which, atthe beginning ofthe month,
have only one month left to maturity. The Treasury bill with
one month to maturity gives the purest risk-free one-month
rate of interest because it is free of default and interest-
rate risk. Data for the one-month risk free rate through 1982
are from the CRSP database, University of Chicago, with
1983-84 upqates constructed by the author.
5. Wh!!lre dividends are ignored, the ex ante expected
value ofalpha will be the dividend differential between the
bank stock and the S&P 500.
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6. The.$10+billion group includes the population of bank
h()lfii~Q<:6mp!3.rjies\illithll1tt'la{Sitecli:1ss,With.·the ·excep~
tiQnsofiseafirs{ Corp., •which was acquired by Bank-
America Corp. in July 1983, andContinental Illinois ....,hich
failed in the Summer of 1984 and was re-formed in Sep-
tember 1984. (BankAmerica Corp. equity excludes Seafirst
prior to July 1983 andiincludesit thereafter;) Separate re-
suits are reported in Table Al for· Seafirst (through JUly
1983) and for Continental Illinois through September 26,
1984.
The $5-10 billion and $1-5 billion groups are samples of
the populations in those size classes, where the choice of
bank holding companies in each group depended on data
availability. Data are from the Data Resources DRI-SEC
database. They were screened by the author to correct
errors and to exclude bank holding companies for which
trading appeared to be infrequent.
7. Because dividends of the bank stocks were not avail-
able, returns throughout (inclUding the S&P 500) exclude
dividends. To the extent that bank stock dividends differed
from those of the S&P 500, total return differentials would
differ from those implied by Figure 1. The author can only
infer the possible bias introduced by omitting dividends
from the fact that the estimated alphas for the three bank
groups over the full period are very close to zero. This fact
suggests that the omission of dividends does not affect
average return differentials significantly. See Footnote 5.
Estimated mean alpha values over the full 1972:08-
1984:09 period for the three bank groups are 0.1 ($10+
billion banks), 0.2 ($5-10 billion banks), and 0.1 ($1-5
billion banks), with median t-statistics of .27, .30, and .30
respectively.
8. Since the paper focuses on the average results of in-
dividual banks, the regressions are run on individual bank
data and the mean coefficients of the individual bank
regressions are reported for each group. Grouping the
banks into portfolios and then running one regression for
each group would seriously overstate the t-statistics be-
cause grouped data would reduce the standard errors by
diversifying away much of the variance in individual bank
data. Median test statistics (R2, Cl'e' and t-statistics) are
reported for the same groups of individual bank regres-
sions. Medians are used for test statistics because mean
test statistics are not appropriate for confidence tests such
as the Hest.
9. As noted in the footnote to Table 3, the median beta
value is insignificantly different from 1.0.
10. For earlier hypotheses and tests of the beta for large
money center banks, see Beebe, 1977and 1983.
11. Beta would rise if the default changed the systematic
risk-sensitivity of the remaining portfolio. It also would rise
somewhat because the market value of capital would de-
cline and hence capital leverage would rise. For a given
systematic risk of bank assets and liabilities, beta of the
bank's equity is sensitive to equity leverage.
12. The longer the estimation period for alpha, the more
likely the estimate is to be zero. There are two reasons forthis result: (1) any mispricing of securities (that is, market
inefficiency) is likely to be very short-lived; and (2) the
longer the time period, the less likely it would be for new
information to be serial.ly correlated. For isolated banks,
alpha estimates in Table 3 are significant in some cases.
See Appendix TableM.
13·.iTl"1e···'ITlClrket-fela.t~·'priQe •• leVel~fQftheindi()l:lsinfig­
urE;l2 are Calculated by setting the price•level. in 1981 :12
equal to 100 and then cumulating the. monthly market-re-
lated returns that are derived from Equation (3).
14. The 24 banks in the cross-section sample include the
22 banks in the $10+ billion size group (Appendix Table
A1) plus North Carolina Bank Corporation and Republic
New York Corporation, which are the two largest banks in
the $5~10 billion group. Seafirst and Continental Illinois
are excluded from the sample.
15. For an analysis of the market's perception of spillover
effects from Continental Illinois, see Furlong, 1984.
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